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UNFAIR COMPETITIOIN
UNFAIR COMPETITION AND ITS LATE DEVELOP-
MENTS.
The right of a manufacturer or seller of a commercial
article to appropriate to his exclusive use as a trade-mark
a word or symbol to indicate that the articles have originated
with or been selected by him, has long been recognized, and
in the United States, Great Britain and many other coun-
tries, legislation has been in force for many years providing
for the registration of such marks.
It has also long been recognized that a manufacturer or
trader who has acquired by adoption and use, a suitable trade-
mark, has a property right therein, and that he is entitled
to protection in its exclusive use because it is his property.
It has also been recognized that the public has an interest in
the protection of trade-marks in order that purchasers and
consumers of commercial articles may not be misled or de-
frauded into buying articles other than those they desire or
intend to purchase.
In Upton on Trade-Marks it is said that "property in
trade-marks, exclusive and absolute, has existed and been
recognized as a legal possession, which may be bought and sold
and transmitted, from the earliest days of our recorded juris-
prudence."
While recognizing property in trade-marks, courts of
equity at first refused to interfere by injunction for their
protection. In 1742 Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, in Blanchard
vs. Hill, refused an injunction to restrain the defendant from
making use of the Great Mogul as a trade-mark upon cards.
In denying the motion for an injunction the Lord Chancellor
said:
"In the first place, the motion is to restrain the defendant
from making cards with the same mark which the plaintiff
has appropriated to himself, and, in this respect, there is no
foundation for this court to grant such an injunction. Every
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particular trader has some particular mark or stamp; but
1 do not know any instance of granting an injunction here
to restrain one trader from using the same mark with another,
and I think it would be of mischievous consequence to do it."
In 1816 an injunction was granted to restrain a manufac-
turer from using, upon blacking, labels in imitation of those
employed by the plaintiff. Other cases both in England and
in the United States adopted the same practice both as to
labels and trade-marks and it soon became a well established
doctrine that the exclusive property of the owner of a trade-
mark is entitled to the protection which the highest powers of
the courts can furnish. The power of the court in such cases
is exercised both to do individual justice and to safeguard
the interests of the public. "The right of property in trade-
marks has become to be recognized as of immense and incal-
culable value. Trade-marks, it has been truthfully said, are
the only means by which the manufacturer and the merchant
are enabled to inspire and retain public confidence in the
quality and integrity of things made and sold, and the only
means by which the public is protected against frauds and
impositions of the crafty and designing who are always alert
to appropriate to themselves the fruits of the reputations of
others. "
In restraining by injunction the passing off by one dealer
of his own goods as those of the goods of a competitor the
jurisdiction of a court of equity is in aid of the legal right and
is founded on the protection of property from irreparable
damage. A court of equity in such cases acts on the same
principle upon which it interferes in other cases in protect-
ing legal rights to property.
While a wide range is necessarily permitted to a manu-
facturer or dealer in the selection and adoption of a trade
mark, it was realized at an early date that certain limitations
upon this power of selection must be made or otherwise the
first adopter for trade-mark purposes of words that should
rightfully be open to general use might monopolize business
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to which he was not entitled and seriously interfere with
freedom of commerce.
Following this rule the courts, at an early date, refused
to recognize as vilid trade-marks, geographical names,
descriptive words and personal names. Marks designating
patented articles were also held to become dedicated to the
public upon the expiration of the patents upon the articles
to which they were applied.
There can be no question about the soundness or the fair-
ness of the position taken by the court in reference to marks
o this character. If descriptive words such as "Iron
Bitters," (Brown v. Meyer, 133 U. S. 540), geographical
names such as "Lackawanna," or personal names like
"Brown," could be exclusively appropriated as trade-marks,
it goes without saying that commerce would be greatly ham-
pered, and injustice would be done to many manufacturers
and producers of commercial articles, as well as to the general
public.
As said by Mr. Justice Strong, in the familiar Lackawanna
case:
"The word 'Lackawanna' was not devised by the com-
plainants. They found it a settled and known appellative
of the district in which their coal deposits, and those of others,
were situated. At a time when they began to use it, it was a
recognized description of the region, and of course of the
earths and minerals in the region. * * * And it is
obvious that the same reasons which forbid the exclusive
appropriation of generic names, or of those merely descrip-
tive of the article manufactured, and which can be employed
with truth by other manufacturers, apply with equal force
to the appropriations of geographical names, designating
districts of country. Their nature is such that they cannot
point to the origin (personal origin) or ownership of the
articles of trade to which they may be applied. They point
only at the place of production, not to the producer, and,
could they be appropriated exclusively, the appropriation
would result in mischievous monopolies. * * * It must be
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then considered as sound doctrine that no one can apply the
name of a district of country to a well-known article of com-
merce, and obtain thereby such an exclusive right to the
application as to prevent others inhabiting the district, or
dealing in similar articles coming from the district, from
truthfully using the same designation."
"He has no right to appropriate a sign or a symbol which
from the nature of the fact it is used to signify, others may
employ with equal truth, and therefore, have an equal right
to employ for the same purpose." (13 Wall. 311-327.)
It soon became apparent, however, that the refusal to recog-
nize trade-mark rights in geographical and personal names
and in descriptive words, left the door open, in many instances
for flagrant piracies upon the established trade and valuable
good-will -of important business enterprises.
In some cases it appeared that a descriptive word had
been so employed and associated with an article of commerce
that it had come to mean that article to the public rather thvn
to convey, in that particular connection, its original descrip-
tive meaning.
The sime was also true in many instances with respect to
geographical and -ersonal names. In such cases the courts
did not hesitate to hold that notwithstanding the rule against
appropriation of geographical and personal names and
descriptive words, the words in question were to be considered
as having acquired secondary meanings which took them out
of the prohibited classes. Instances of such cases are found
in the English courts in the "Glenfield Starch." the "Stone
Ale" and "Camel Hair Belting" litigations, and in Massachu-
setts in American Waltham Watch Co.. v. M: S. Watch Co.,
in which it was held that the name "Waltham" on watche'
while originally used in a geographical, sense, had, by con-
tinued use, acquired a secondary me-ning as a designation
of watches of a particular class, and that purchasers had
come to understand that watches stamped with the name of
"Waltham" are watcbes made by the American Watch Co.
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As early as 1887 the Supreme Court of Kentucky in an
opinion by Judge Holt, said:
"While one who sells a product of a particular region of
country cannot appropriate the name of that region to indi-
cate the article he sells, to the exclusion of others who produce
or sell a similar product of the same region, yet a geograph-
ical name, as applied to a manufactured article, in connection
with which the manufacturer was the first to use it, may
acquire a secondary meaning, and thus become a valid trade-
mark, but such a right will not be declared or protected unless
clearly shown." (Metcalfe v. Breund, 86 Ky. 151.)
It often occurs, however, that a manufacturer cannot show
that a geographical or* descriptive word employed by him, has
acquired a secondary meaning, and yet it may be apparent
that the continued use of such words by an other may result
in actual injustice. To illustrate, Minneapolis has a world-
wide reputation as a flour manufacturing center. The right to
use this geographical term upon packages of flour manufac-
tured at Minneapolis is of great value to every miller in that
city. California fruits are known and have a high reputa-
tion at least in all parts of the United States. To permit a
miller in some other part of the country to brand his flour
"Minneapolis" would work, not only a fraud upon the public,
but a positive damage to every miller located in the Flour
City. A similar result would follow the labeling of fruits,
not grown in California, with the name of that State.
It was necessary, in view of the forced limitations upon
trade-mark rights for courts of equity to supplement trade
mark principles with rules reaching cases of piracy in which
technical trade-mark rights were ineffective. To this end there
has been developed, both in the English and American courts,
the principle of protection known to us as "unfair competi-
tion," and generally spoken of in England and Canada as
"passing off."
In 1899 District Judge Bradford, in discussing the sub-
Ject of unfair competition, said:
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"The gradual but progressive judicial develQpment of the
doctrine of unfair competition in trade has shed lustre on that
branch of our jurisprudence as an embodiment, to a marked
degree, of the principles of high business morality, involving
the nicest discrimination between those things which may, and
those whicia may not, be done in the course of honorable
rivalry in business. This doctrine rests on the broad proposi-
tion that equity will not permit anyone to palm off his goods
on the public as those of another. The law of trade-marks
is only one branch of the doctrine. But while the law of
trade-marks is but part of the law of unfair competition in
trade, yet when the two are viewed in contradistinction to
each other an essential difference is to be observed. The
infringement of trade-marks is the violation by one person
of an exclusive right of another person to the use of a word,
mark or symbol. Unfair competition in trade, as distinguished
from infringement of trade-marks, does not involve the
violation of any exclusive right to the use of a word, mark
or symbol. The word may be purely generic or descriptive,
and the mark or symbol indicative only of style, size, shape
or quality, and as such open to public use 'like the adjectives
of the language' yet there may be unfair competition in trade
by an improper use of such word, mark or symbol. Two
rivals in business competing with each other in the same line
of goods may have an equal right to use the same words,
marks or symbols on similar articles produced ,r sold by
them respectively, yet if such words, marks or symbols were
used by one of them before the other and by association have
come to indicate to the public that the goods to which they
are applied are of the production of the former, the latter
will not be permitted, with intent to mislead the public, to
use such words, marks or symbols in such a manner, by trade
dress or otherwise, as to deceive or be capable of deceiving the
public as to the origin, manufacture or ownership of the
articles to which they are applied; and the latter may be
required, when using such words, marks or symbols, to place
on articles of his own production or the packages in which they
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aro usually sold something clearly denoting the origin, manu-
facture or ownership of such articles, or negativing any
idea that they were produced or sold by the former."
To the same effect is the language of Mr. Justice Brown,
in the Coats Thread case, in which he said:
"Irrespective of the technical question of trade-mark,
the defendants have no right to dress their goods up in
such manner, as to deceive an intending purchaser, and
induce him to believe he is buying those of the plaintiff.
Rival manufacturers may lawfully compete for the patronage
of the public in the quality and price of their goods, in the
beauty and tastefulness of their enclosing packages, in the
extent of their advertising, and in the employment of agents,
but they have no right, by imitative devices, to beguile the
public into buying their wares under the impression they are
buying those of their rivals." (Coats v. Merrick Thread Co.,
149 U. S. 562.)
The principles stated in these cases have been followed
and extended in many directions, until, as has been recently
said, "With the expansion of commerce, there has been de-
veloped in recent years a well defined jurisprudence in cases
of this character, involving what has come to be known as
unfair competition."
The weakness of a technical trade-mark lies in the fact
tlt it can be and has been defined, and its boundaries have
been fixed by judicial decisions.
The road to evasion of the rights of the trade-mark owner
are. therefore, marked out for the would-be imitator and
competitor. He knows that marks of a certain character may
be imitated with impunity because the original user could not
acquire any exclusive right thereto. Courts, however, have
never undertaken to define fraud. As unfair competition is
invariably a species of fraud, no attempt has ever been made
to dofine it, and no boundary lines have ever been established.
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The elements entering into and producing unfair competi-
tion may be as diverse and varied as human wit and ingenuity
can make them. It, therefore, frequently happens that the
courts, while declaring a particular mark invalid as a trade-
mark, may grant full relief against its piracy on the ground
of unfair competition. And not only may the prohibitive
relief be as effective, but the money recovery may be as great
in one case as in the other. Thus in the "American Girl"
case (Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. Wolf Brothers & Co., 239
U. S. 251) the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit had directed a decree for plaintiff on the ground of
unfair competition, and holding that the term "American
Girl" was not the subject of a valid trade-mark. It awarded
plaintiff the profits defendant had made on the goods sold by
it under the name "American Lady." The Supreme Court
found that the term "American Girl" constituted a valid
trade-mark. In allowing plaintiff the same recovery that had
been fixed by the Court of Appeals, it said:
"The account was based upon undisputed data, and no
reason is suggested why, if otherwise accurate, it is not as
properly applicable upon the theory of trade-marks as upon
that of unfair competition aside from trade-mark infringe-
ment-at least, so far as defendant is entitled to criticize
it; complainant is not attacking the decree."
It is true that in this case the Supreme Court expressly
states that it does not find it necessary to pass upon the
question of the proper measure of recovery in a non-trade-
mark case. It is believed, however, that the decision of
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in this case,
awarding the plaintiff profits on an unfair competition decree
was correct, notwithstanding the dissenting opinion.
That the use of an invalid trade-mark may constitute
unfair competition in trade is held in the litigation over the
word "Scandinavia" applied to belting, which arose in the
United States District Court for the Southern District of
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New York. The trial court (8 T. 14. Rep. 124) held the reg-
istered trade-mark upon the word "Scandanavia," registered
under the "Ten Year Clause," invalid on the ground that
the plaintiff had only a limited ownership in the mark and
was not entitled to register it, and it held that 'Scandinavia"
is a geographical word and, therefore, could not be appro-
priated as a common law trade-mark. The decree, however,
qustained the cause of action as to unfair competition and
directed a perpetual injunction against the defendant. The
Court of Appeals in a decision by Judge Rogers (257 Fed.
937) held that the name was geographical and could not
constitute a valid trade-mark at common law. It found,
however, that plaintiff had a valid registered trade-mark
under the "Ten Year Clause" of the Act of 1905, and sus-
tained the bill. Referring to the charges of unfair competi.
tion the opinion states:
"The defendant is charged with unfair competition. The
law of unfair competition is broader than is the common
law or the statute law of trade-marks, so that one may be
entitled to relief on the ground of unfair competition who is
denied relief under the law of trade marks, and that is what
happened in the court below. That court granted tie plain-
tiff an injunction, although it held its trade-mark void, be-
cause the judge concluded the charge of unfair competition
was sustained by the evidence. In view of the fact that this
court holds the registered trade-mark valid, little need be said
as to the unfair competition, although if the court had not
sustained the validity of the registered trade-mark, we should
have found no difficulty in affirming that portion of the
decree dealing with the question of unfair competition."
The doctrine of unfair competition is not limited in its
present day application merely to cases involving imitation
of labels and packages in the sale of goods. Any unfair prac-
tices interfering with any established good-will or business
may be reached and prohibited upon a proper showing through
a court of equity.
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It has thus been possible for Minneapolis millers, no one
of whom has any exclusive right to the use of the word " IMin-
neapolis" upon a sack of flour, to enjoin millers located in
another state from branding their flour with that word.
California fruit growers have been able to enjoin the branding
of fruits not grown in California with the name of that state.
In some instances persons have been prohibited from using
their own names in business where such use will deceive the.
public as to the identity of his business or product.
A court of equity will not, however, interfere in every
case where there is a mere showing of confusion, resulting
from the common use of identical or similar geographical,
personal or descriptive words. In every instance the ques-
tion to be determined is whether the acts complained of are
fair or unfair, honest or dishonest; whether the second comer
into the field, is trying by imitative devices or other unfair
means to sell his goods as and for those of the one who has
the established trade; whether the newcomer is trying by
any artifice, misrepresentation, or deceitful conduct to pirate
upon the good-will of an established business, whether it be
technically a manufacturing or commercial business, a pro-
fession, or any other legitimate business pursuit.
The principles governing cases of unfair competition in
trade, have been extended and applied to the protection of
trade secrets, and also to the protection of contracts, where
efforts have been made to induce a party thereto, to violate
or abandon the same. Moreover, beginning with the Singer
case, decided by the Supreme Court, the dedication of trade-
marks and trade-names to the public by reason of expiration
of patents, has been hedged about with requirements and
conditions on the part of an attempted user of such marks
and names as will prevent the possibility of interference with
the established good will of the original user.
By this development of the doctrine of unfair competition,
the law of trade-marks has been supplemented and strength-
ened, so that it is difficult today for anyone to accomplish a
successful piracy upon the reputation and good-will o -,ny
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established business, whatever may be the character of the
business, and whether protected by trade-marks or not.
A brief reference to some of the more recent decided
cases will illustrate the breadth and underlying character
of this branch of jurisprudence.
In Shredded Wheat Co. v Humphrey Cornell Co. (250
Fed. 960), where it appeared that a design patent upon
v!a~nt:ff's shredded wheat biscuit had expired, it was held
I)y the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit that
the appearance of plaintiff's biscuit had acquired a "sec-
ondary" meaning, and defendant was required as to all
biscuits reaching the last purchaser outside of their cartons,
to impress in their substance a letter, cross or other plain
symbol, or to fasten upon them a wrapping, tag or band
stating the name of the manufacturer. It was said by the
same court in a subsequent decision, Hercules Powder Co. v.
Newton (254 Fed. 906), that in this case "the possibilities of
relief against unfair competition, find an extreme example."
In M. M. Newcomer Co. v. Newcomer's New Store, (217
S. W. 822), decided November 15, 1919, by the Supreme Court
oi Tennessee, the following appears in the opinion:
"An injunction was issued under the prayer of the bill
restraining the defendant corporation from using the name
'Newcomer's New Store' in the conduct of its business.
Whereupon, the defendants placed signs on their front door
at 508 Gay Street in the city of Knoxville, where said business
was being conducted, advertising said business under the
name of 'Newcomer's Store.' Then a supplemental bill was
filed by complainant enjoining the defendants from using the
name 'Newcomer's Store.' Whereupon the defendants
adopted for their business the name 'M. M. Newcomer, in no
way connected with the M. M. Newcomer Company or NYa-
coner's Department Store.' Thereupon the complainant
amended its supplemental bill, and the defendants were
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restrained from using the name 'M. M. Newcomer' in con-
nection with their business."
Upon the hearing of the cause the temporar., injunctions
were made perpetual and from the decree of the Chancellor
an appeal was taken to the Court of Civil Appeals where the
decree was affirmed. The cause was then taken to the Su-
preme Court by writ of certiorari, which affirmed the
decree of the Court of Civil Appeals. It was found that the
use of the name "Newcomer" by the defendant was for
the fraudulent purpose of deluding the public and injuring
the complainant. This case is near the limit in prohibiting
the use of an individual name.
In International News Service v. Associated Press, 249
U. S. 215, the question argued before the Supreme Court,
was whether defendant might lawfully be restrained from
appropriating news taken from the bulletins issued by com-
plainant, or any of its members, or from newspapers pub-
lished by them, for the purpose of reselling it to the defend-
ant's clients. Complainant asserted that defendant's ad-
mitted course of conduct in this regard violated complainant's
property right in the news and constituted unfair competi-
tion in business. In delivering the opinion of the Supreme
Court Mr. Justice Pitney said:
"Obviously, the question of what is unfair competition in
business must be determined with particular reference to the
character and circumstances of the business. The question
here is not so much the rights of either party as against the
public but their rights as between themselves * *
In order to sustain the jurisdiction of equity over the con-
troversy we need not affirm any general and absolute prop-
erty in the news as such. The rule that a court of equity
concerns itself only in the protection of property rights treats
any civil right of a pecuniary nature as a property right;
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and the right to acquire property by honest labor or the
conduct of a lawful business is as much entitled to protection
as the right to guard property already acquired. It is this
right that furnishes the basis of the jurisdiction in the ordi-
nary case of unfair competition.
"It is said that the elements of unfair competition are
lacking because there is no attempt by defendant to palm off
its goods as those of the complainant, characteristic of those
most familiar, if not the most typical, cases of unfair com-
petition. * * * * But we cannot concede that the right
to equitable relief is confined to that class of cases. In the
present case the fraud upon complainant's rights is more
direct and obvious. Regarding news matter as the mere
material from which these two competing parties are endeav-
oring to make money and treating it, therefore, as quasi prop-
erty, for the purpose of their business because they are both
selling it as such, defendant's conduct differs from the ordi-
nary case of unfair competition in trade principally in this,
that, instead of selling its own goods as those of the com-
plainant's, it substitutes misappropriation in the place of
misrepresentation and sells complainant's goods as its own."
In upholding the right of the plaintiff to relief in this
case Judge Hough, writing the opinion of the Circuit Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit (245 Fed. 244), said:
"Unfair competition, like all oft-uttered legal phrases,
has acquired rather a narrow case. In McLean v. Fleming,
96 U. S. 251, a decision which is near the foundation of
American Case Law on this subject, it was said that what
equity enjoined the wrongdoer from depriving another of
is 'the advantage of celebrity.' This thought has led to the
feeling that what a plaintiff must be robbed of is the good-will
and business ease resulting from his well-known name, or the
attractive dressing, wrapping, or form of his product; that
such robbery must be by imitation; and that the test of such
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imitation is the effect upon the public, of that part thereof
likely to require wares such as those in controversy.
"But this is not all the law nor the only sort of unfairness
in business methods practiced by a competitor, and resulting
in a continuing tort, for which the law affords no adequate
remedy-that comes under the condemnation of equity.
"Equity, however, is not stayed because a name does not
fit, or one is not at hand to accurately describe a wrong of a
kind necessarily infrequent. If defendant takes what some-
one else owns, and sells it as of right, in rivalry with the
owner, such competition is more than unfair; it is patently
unlawful and the wider terms comprises the narrower, But,
laying aside the right of property as the ultimate foundation
of suit, the business method of selling, in competition with
plaintiff and its members, something falsely represented as
gathered by defendant otherwise than from bulletins and
early editions, is unfair, because it is parasitic and untrue.
It is immoral and that is usually unfair to someone."
Another interesting case, showing a wide departure from
early decisions in unfair trade controversies, is that of the
court last referred to, in the case of Aunt Jemima Mills Co., v.
Rigney & Co. (247 Fed. 407), in which the right of the plain-
tiff, the manufacturer of Aunt Jemima's Pancake Flour, to
enjoin the use by the defendant of a like trade-mark upon
syrup, was upheld.
In the District Court, Judge Veeder had dismissed the
bill of complaint (234 Fed. 804) saying:
"There is no trade-mark infringement here. To sustain
a charge of infringement, the owner must have used it on
goods of the same descriptive properties as the goods sold
by the alleged infringer.
"The same considerations are practically decisive of the
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issue of unfair competition. The objects of the law of unfair
competition, as stated by the Circuit Court of Appeals of this
circuit in Florence Mfg. Co. v. J. C. Dowd & Co. (178 Fed.
73), are:
I'Firft, to protect the honest trader in the business which
fairly belongs to him; second, to punish the dishonest trader
who is taking his competitor 's business away by unfair means;
and third, to protect the public from deception.'
"The fundamental basis of the private remedy is, however,
not the protection of the public from imposition, but injury
to the complainant. That the public is deceived may be evi-
dence of the fact that the original proprietor's rights are being
invaded. If, however, the rights of the original proprietor
are in no wise interfered with, the deception of the public
is of no concern of a court of chancery. So, although fraudu-
lent conduct, which is calculated to deceive the public, is a
necessary element, it is the private loss of the complainant
that is to be prevented, not the public injury arising to others.
This is in conformity with general principles. A court of
equity cannot enforce as such the police power of the state.
It is not sufficient, therefore, that the use of a mark by a
subsequent appropriator is calculated to deceive the public
into believing that his goods are the goods of, that is, made
by, the original proprietor of the mark."
Asserting that it found no case entirely like the present,
the Court of Appeals in an opinion by Judge Ward, found
that the use by the defendants of precisely the same mark,
was:
"Evidence of intention to make something out of it-
either to get the benefit of the complainant's reputation or of
its, advertisement or to forestall the extension of its trade.
There is no other conceivable reason why they should have
oppropriated this precise mark. The taking being wrongful,
we think the defendants have no equity to protect them against
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an injunction, unless they get it from a consideration now to
be examined."
This consideration here referred to by the court is the
rule that "a technical trade-mark may be appropriated by
anyone in any market for goods not in competition with those
of the prior user." The court thought, however, that this
did not apply to related articles like those in the case before
it, saying:
"But we think that goods, though different, may be so
related as to fall within the mischief which equity should
prevent. Syrup and flour are both food products, and food
products commonly used together. Obviously the public, or
a large part of it, seeing this trade-mark on a syrup would
conclude that it was made by the complainant. Perhaps they
might not do so if it were used for flat-irons. In this way the
complainant's reputation is put into the hands of the defend-
ants. It will enable them to get the benefit .of the complain-
ant's reputation and advertisements. These we think are
property rights which should be protected in equity.."
We thus see in the Scandinavia case that the imitator of
an invalid trade-mark may be enjoined in equity, although he
would be without redress in an action for infringement of
his trade-mark, and in the case last cited the owner of a valid
trade-mark may, under the rules of unfair competition, enjoin
the use of his mark upon goods of another class where the
court could afford him no relief in an action for infringement
either of a common law or a registered trade-mark.
It seems to us that the basis for this modem development
of the doctrine of unfair competition is to be found in the
view expressed by Mr. Justice Pitney in the Associated Press
case that "the right to acquire property by honest labor or
the conduct of a lawful business is as much entitled to pro-
tection as the right to guard properiy already acquired,"
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and in the further view expressed by Judge Hough in the same
controversy that an act that is immoral "is usually unfair
to someone."
Under these decisions and others of the same tenor the
rules respecting unfair competition have in recent years been
materially broadened until today any competitor who seeks
an unfair advantage over any established business of what-
ever nature, whether a trade or a profession, is likely to
find himself restrained by the powerful hand of a court of
equity; be called upon to account for profits unjustly made,
and to be required to compensate his competitor for dam-
ages inflicted by his wrongful acts.
AmASA C. PAUL,
Minneapolis, Minnesota.
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